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Abstract
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Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil 
conflict as a consequence of a Maoist insurgency, which 
many argue also brought about an increase in female 
empowerment. This paper exploits within and between-
district variation in the intensity of violence to estimate 
the impact of conflict intensity on two key areas of the 
life of women in Nepal, namely education and marriage. 
Overall conflict intensity had a small, positive effect on 
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female educational attainment, whereas abductions by 
Maoists had the reverse effect. Male schooling was not 
significantly affected by either conflict measure. Conflict 
intensity and Maoist abductions during school age both 
increased the probability of early female marriage, but 
exposure to conflict during marriageable age does not 
appear to have affected women’s long-term marriage 
probability.
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1. Introduction 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil conflict as a consequence of a 
Maoist insurgency. Numerous human rights violations were recorded, going from direct 
casualties in violent exchanges between Maoist insurgents and government forces, to rape and 
torture of civilians by the army, and extortion and abductions by rebels. Over 13,000 people died 
during the conflict, and an estimated 200,000 were displaced (US Agency for International 
Development, 2007). Contrary to a few conflict episodes of extraordinary magnitude which have 
attracted much attention in the literature such as Rwanda and Burundi, the Nepalese civil 
conflict has been of moderate intensity, involving the displacement of less than 1% of the 
population. 
Although men are typically more affected by direct conflict-related mortality, women face 
more insidious challenges, as they have to take on new roles to replace men who get involved in 
the fighting or migrate for work, are more vulnerable to sexual violence, and, in many 
developing societies, may have to bear more heavily the brunt of reduced family resources. 
Given the ubiquity of violent civil conflict in developing areas of the world, and the well-
known additional difficulties faced by women in these countries, it would be useful to better 
understand the contribution of conflict to female deprivation so as to inform policy. Indeed, there 
is little evidence of the impact of civil conflict on gender inequality to date. 
This is of particular concern in Nepal, where women entered the conflict (in 1996) being 
very disadvantaged compared to their male counterparts in terms of human development, 
including education (only 21% of female adults were literate compared to 54% of male adults) 
and life expectancy at birth (52.4 years as opposed to 55 for men, despite the natural female 
longevity advantage). To put these figures into international perspective, Nepal’s gender 
development index stood at 0.27, compared to 0.34 for Bangladesh, 0.42 in India, and a 0.56 
average for all developing countries (Ojha, 2004). 
In Nepal, however, the insurgents took a strong position against (caste-, ethnicity- and) 
gender-biased traditions, and although this egalitarian rhetoric was not thoroughly followed in 
practice, women have been directly involved in combat – it has been reported that up to one-
third of guerillas were female – and there is anecdotal evidence of an improvement in the 
condition of women in areas controlled by the Maoists, e.g., through a decrease in polygamy, 
domestic violence, and alcoholism (Lama-Tamang et al., 2003; Manchanda, 2004; Geiser, 2005; 
Ariño, 2008). On the one hand, direct involvement in fighting should heighten the adverse 
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impact of the conflict on women. On the other hand, many more women have not been involved 
in the fighting and may have experienced both the expected adverse effects of war and some 
degree of social improvement due to the Maoist influence – whether due to genuine social 
change, fear of insurgent reprisal, or the unintended increase in female participation in activities 
traditionally reserved to men due to the men’s involvement in the fighting and migration to seek 
work elsewhere (Menon and Rodgers, 2011). The overall impact on gender inequality is 
therefore unclear. 
In this paper, I exploit within- and between- district variation in the intensity of violence, as 
measured by the number of fatalities, but also school destructions, and abductions by Maoists, to 
shed light on ways in which the conflict affected two key areas of decision in a woman’s life, 
namely education and family formation. More specifically, I estimate the impact of conflict 
intensity on educational attainment for men and women and on the probability of marriage (for 
women). Violent civil conflict may affect education, and may do so unevenly for men and 
women for a variety of reasons. In addition, the functioning of the marriage market may be 
affected by conflict either directly, or indirectly through changes in schooling. 
Educational attainment is generally expected to be adversely affected by exposure to violent 
civil conflict. Direct youth enrollment in the military, limited mobility, and the destruction of 
schools may all negatively affect the ability of children to attend school. Increased poverty may 
pressurize parents into taking children out of school (to avoid direct costs), and putting them to 
work (to avoid opportunity costs). Political instability and reduced life expectancy may decrease 
the expected returns to education and, in turn, reduce investments in human capital. Last but not 
least, in the case of Nepal, parents may have been deterred from sending their children to school 
out of fear of having them abducted by the insurgents (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Quoting 
figures from the Informal Sector Service (INSEC), UNESCO (2010) reports that between 2002 
and 2006, the Maoists destroyed 79 schools, one university and 13 district education offices, 
while 10,621 teachers and 21,998 students were abducted (p.8). According to additional data 
provided by INSEC, the total number of abductions by Maoist forces during the whole conflict 
totaled over 85,000. While most abductees were seemingly returned safe and sound after a few 
days of intensive indoctrination (Macours, 2011), a number of youths joined the Maoists fighters 
(in 2003, an estimated 30% of Maoists forces were aged 14-18) and between 1996 and 2006, 145 
teachers and 344 students were killed and many more wounded (UNESCO, 2010). 
The adverse effect on education could be higher for women if a conflict-related decrease in 
income affects investment in female human capital disproportionately or if there are 
overwhelming concerns about physical violence (including sexual violence) leading the 
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movement of girls to be more restricted than that of boys. On the other hand, if the leading 
channel through which conflict decreases human capital accumulation is through direct 
engagement of children in fighting, then boys would be more negatively affected. 
However, the general expectation that schooling should be disrupted in regions of more 
intense fighting may not be very well founded in Nepal. First, national trends do not indicate an 
increase in poverty coinciding with the conflict but a steady decrease in poverty instead (World 
Bank, 2005). Second, the insurgents have been reported to actively and coercively challenge 
traditions that tend to decrease educational attainment, namely discrimination against women, 
lower castes and indigenous ethnic groups (Hart, 2001; Lama-Tamang et al., 2003; Aguirre and 
Pietropaoli, 2008). 
In Nepal, marriage is almost universal, arranged marriages are the norm, and early marriages 
are quite common, especially for girls. Nearly 80 percent of 20-year old women and of 25-year 
old men surveyed in the 2001 and 2006 Demographic and Health Surveys of Nepal were already 
married (Figure 1). Adverse economic conditions such as those potentially brought about by 
civil conflict and a potential shortage of husbands due to the fighting and migration are unlikely 
to affect the quasi-universality of marriage, but violent conflict could lead to an increase in the 
proportion of women who do not marry and are therefore likely to end up in submissive 
positions in the household of a relative. Younger brides are generally preferred by prospective 
grooms, so that the dowry attached to them is lower. Civil conflict may therefore also lead 
impoverished parents to favor early marriages. If the conflict affects female educational 
outcomes, it is also likely to have an impact on early marriage, as girls who leave school earlier 
are more likely to be married young. In addition, the strong focus on sexual purity, of unmarried 
girls especially, in most religious groups of Nepal, combined with the reported prevalence of 
rape during the conflict (Manchanda, 2004; Ariño, 2008), may have ruined the chances of 
marriage for a number of rape victims, or encouraged parents to marry their daughters early to 
prevent it. On the other hand, Maoist insurgents are reported to have opposed early marriage and 
even tried to abolish dowry (Hart, 2001; Manchanda, 2004; Aguirre and Pietropaoli, 2008), and 
Maoist recruitment targeted girls under 18, which may have contributed to increase age at 
marriage. Age at marriage matters insofar as women who marry younger are more likely to have 
an inferior position in the couple (Niraula and Morgan, 1996). Marriage practices largely 
condition the future life of the spouses, especially so for women, and so the impact of civil 
conflict on marriage is of major importance for the human capital accumulation, fertility, and 
long-term wellbeing of women. 
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Figure 1 goes about here. 
In the next section, I review the existing evidence on the impact of conflict on education and 
family formation, with an emphasis on male-female differences, before turning to the 
presentation of the Nepalese context in Section 3, data and estimation methods in Section 4, and 
estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Education 
As put by Blattman and Miguel (2010) in a recent survey of causes and consequences of 
civil wars, “The leading question is not whether wars harm human capital stocks, but rather in 
what ways, for whom and how persistently” (p.64). The evidence is still scant, however, and 
there is no emerging consensus. A number of cross-country analyses suggest that political 
instability has large negative effects on growth (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review), 
but results from better-controlled studies using within-country variation in the intensity of 
conflict are more mixed. Miguel and Roland (2006) find that, 25 years down the line, living 
standards and levels of human capital had converged between regions of Vietnam differentially 
affected by bombings during the Vietnam War after instrumenting the number of bombings with 
distance to the 17
th
 parallel north latitude. Other within-country, macro-studies have investigated 
the impact of bombing on city-level population growth, with varied results as to the duration of 
the war effect. Davis and Weinstein (2002) found that, in Japan, the destruction only had a short-
term effect on population growth. Findings in Brakman et al. (2004) indicate that most but not 
all of the effect of WWII bombings in Germany was temporary in Western Germany, but that it 
was persistent in the long run in Eastern Germany. 
At the microeconomic level, results from an emerging (difference-in-difference) literature on 
the impact of war-related destruction or civil conflict on educational attainment suggest that the 
effect of conflict is highly heterogeneous, and depends on conflict characteristics, age and 
gender. Although results vary from one context to the other, overall the main losers appear to be 
girls in post-primary education, while the evidence of an adverse impact for primary education is 
generally non-existent (or even sometimes suggests a counterintuitive positive effect). Akbulut-
Yuksel (2009) finds that German individuals of school age during World War II who lived in 
cities more heavily targeted by allied bombings had significantly less education than cohorts 
born later, compared to individuals of the same age exposed to less bombings. In Guatemala, 
where the worst period of the Guatemalan civil war (1979-1984) saw over 25,000 deaths (to be 
compared with a current Guatemalan population of 13 Million), Chamarbagwala and Morán 
6 
 
(2011) find that individuals who were of schooling age in departments more affected by the war 
between 1979 and 1984 completed fewer years of schooling, and that this effect was much more 
marked for girls (who lost 0.55 years compared to a loss of 0.13 for boys). Nevertheless, the 
authors also find a significant, positive correlation between conflict intensity and educational 
achievement at low grades (Grades 1 to 3), while the main losers appear to be girls found in 
higher grades (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2008). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Swee (2009) 
estimates that cohorts of children exposed to higher intensity of conflict at the municipality level 
were less likely to complete secondary schooling, but that primary attainment was unaffected. 
Shemyakina (forthcoming) finds that girls (but not boys) who were of schooling age during the 
Tajik civil war of 1992-1998 in areas severely affected by conflict events are less likely to 
complete mandatory schooling (9 grades). Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) conclude that, in 
Colombia, children aged 12 and older exposed to more violence at the municipality level are 
more likely to drop out and enter the labor market. Three recent papers, one by Akresh and de 
Walque (forthcoming), and two by Jeannie Annan, Christopher Blattman and colleagues (Annan 
et al., 2009; Blattman and Annan, 2010) illustrate the marked heterogeneity in findings on the 
impact of civil conflict across demographic groups and across conflicts. Akresh and de Walque 
(forthcoming) analyze the impact of the Rwandan genocide on schooling outcomes. They 
estimate that cohorts of children exposed to this extremely violent conflict episode, which killed 
10 percent of the country’s population, completed 18.3 percent fewer years of education. But 
contrary to results from, e.g., Guatemala (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011), they find that non-
poor, male individuals were more negatively affected. Studying the effect of forced recruitment 
into the Ugandan Lord’s Liberation Army, Jeannie Annan, Christopher Blattman and colleagues 
find dramatically different effects for men and for women, in the opposite direction to, e.g., 
Shemyakina (forthcoming) and Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011).  Abducted men, who, in 
their sample, were on average abducted for just over 15 months, experienced much worse 
educational attainment and labor market outcomes, as well as poorer psychological health 
(Blattman and Annan, 2010). But they find no such effects for female abductees, which they 
attribute to the lack of opportunities for women in general (Annan et al., 2009). 
 
2.2. Marriage 
Marriage practices are likely to be affected by violent civil conflict, be it for economic 
reasons (marriages are expensive, especially for the parents of the bride who have to pay the 
dowry), as a direct consequence of the fighting (groom shortages, delayed decisions due to 
uncertainty over the survival of a young groom, Maoist opposition to religious traditions), or 
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because of the migration of young males likely induced by conflict. 200,000 people are believed 
to have been displaced due to the conflict (US Agency for International Development, 2007). 
However, recent research investigating the direct effect of violence on migration decisions in 
one district of Nepal moderately affected by the conflict finds that conflict intensity does not 
increase the probability of migration outside the district, and that there is a U-shaped relationship 
for migration inside the district, after controlling for individual socio-economic and demographic 
indicators (Bohra Mishra and Massey, forthcoming). 
Despite the existence of several studies of the impact of economic shocks on marriage (e.g., 
Caldwell et al., 1986; Palloni et al., 1996; Nobles and Buttenheim, 2006), to the best of my 
knowledge there are only two previous analyses looking into the effect of civil conflict on 
marriage. Shemyakina (2009) presents difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of 
exposure to the Tajik conflict on the probability of marriage at a given age and finds that women 
more exposed to violent conflict were 30% less likely to be married at a given age than women 
in areas less exposed to violence. In a less well controlled study, Jayaraman et al. (2009) find 
that women living in areas more affected by the 1994 Rwandan genocide married later compared 
to women with similar childhood rural or urban location, religion, education, and age category, 
but living in areas less affected by the genocide. 
 
3. Nepalese Background 
3.1. General 
Nepal is a landlocked country located between China and India, that counted over 23.2 
Million inhabitants during the last census in 2001 (28.6 Million estimated as of June 2008). 
Two-thirds of the population are employed in agriculture, nearly one third of the population lives 
below the poverty line, and Nepal is one of the 20 poorest countries in the world in terms of 
GDP per capita (CIA Factbook). The average education level in Nepal is very low. In the sample 
used in this paper for the baseline analysis, which, as explained in Section 4.2, comprises 
children aged 5-9 or 16-19 at the beginning of the conflict, summary statistics in Panel A of 
Table 3 show that about three quarters of males, and just above half of females had completed 
primary education when observed in 2006, i.e., when aged 14 or older. Primary schooling 
completion is therefore a relevant cut-off when analyzing the impact of conflict. Related to this 
low educational level, summary statistics in Panel C of Table 3 show that between 16.7 and 20.7 
percent of women aged 6-9 or 16-19 at the beginning of the conflict were married by the age of 
15, depending on district conflict intensity. 
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Despite a relatively intense and durable civil conflict, Nepal has experienced steady growth 
in real gross GDP (5% per year between 1995/96 and 2003/04), an additional increase in 
disposable income due to huge flows of remittances from abroad (representing 12.4% of GDP), 
seen a steady decrease in poverty over the period (from 42% in 1995/96 to 31% in 2003/04), as 
well as an improvement in human development indicators such as primary school enrollment (up 
from 57% to 73%) and child mortality, which decreased by 5% per year (World Bank, 2005; 
Macours, 2011). 
Nepal comprises seventy five districts divided between five development regions: Far 
Western, Mid-Western (where the conflict started), Western, Middle, and Eastern. The Middle 
region is richest, and, just before the start of the conflict, the prevalence of poverty was 
increasing as one moved further West (World Bank, 2005). The intensity of conflict varied 
widely across districts, and I use this variation in order to identify the effect of conflict. 
 
3.2. Conflict 
Nepal was an absolute monarchy until 1990. Despite multiparty democratic elections being 
held in 1991, a Maoist insurgency broke out in 1996, only to end in 2006. The insurgency started 
in February 1996 in the Rolpa district. At first, it was concentrated in a few Communist 
strongholds in Western Nepal, but by the end of the war, conflict-related casualties were 
recorded in 73 out of the 75 Nepalese districts. The Maoist presence varied from sporadic attacks 
to the organization of their own local governments and law courts. Over the course of the 
conflict, Maoists attacked government targets such as army barracks, police posts, local 
government buildings (Do and Iyer, 2010). They were also reported to terrorize, loot, abduct, 
and physically assault civilians (Bohara et al., 2006). On the other hand, government security 
forces also killed civilians and were accused of using children for spying, torturing, displacing 
and summarily convicting civilians (Bohara et al., 2006). 
The principal objective of the insurgents was to obtain the creation of a constituent assembly 
to draft a new constitution. Other important aims were stated to be: land redistribution and 
equality for all castes, language groups, and women. 
 
Figure 2 goes about here 
 
A crucial moment in the conflict was the end put by the Maoists to a short-lived cease-fire 
agreed in 2001. From then on, the government's response intensified dramatically, involving the 
Royal Nepal Army, leading to an escalation of violence (see Figure 2). Another cease-fire was 
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agreed and broken by the Maoists in 2003, who then extended their actions to urban areas (Do 
and Iyer, 2010), going as far as imposing a week-long blockade of the capital Kathmandu in 
August 2004. Building on opposition to King Gyanendra's authoritative reaction to the 
prolonged conflict, the Maoists joined forces with some of the country's major political parties, 
leading to the signature of a peace agreement in November 2006 and the creation of an interim 
government led by a power-sharing coalition including the Maoists. 
 
Figure 3 goes about here 
 
The intensity of conflict varied much across districts of Nepal, as illustrated in Figure 3, 
which depicts the distribution of districts between the three terciles of conflict deaths per 1000 
inhabitants. One specificity of the Nepalese conflict, which is likely to be particularly relevant 
for an analysis of educational and marriage outcomes, is the insurgents’ practice of abducting 
civilians, and more particularly of abducting school children en masse. Contrary to the case of 
the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army mentioned earlier, abductees were generally freed after a 
few days of indoctrination. According to Human Rights Watch (2004), this indoctrination took 
the form of lectures on Maoism, on the abductees’ rights as citizens, and Maoist songs and 
dances. As illustrated by Figure 4, there is a strong correlation between the number of 
abductions by Maoists and intensity of fighting as measured by conflict-related casualties, but 
the relationship is not systematic. Districts with the highest proportion of abductees among the 
population are found in the middle casualties tercile, which may be due to a lesser need for 
indoctrination in the Maoist strongholds. 
 
Figure 4 goes about here 
 
Several arguments have been put forward to explain the district variation in the intensity of 
the insurgency, including geography (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006; Do and 
Iyer, 2010), poverty (Murshed and Gates, 2004; Do and Iyer, 2010), lack of political 
participation (Bohara et al., 2006), and inter-group inequality (Murshed and Gates, 2005; 
Macours 2011). But very little is known so far of the impact of the conflict, both at the aggregate 
and gender-differentiated levels. 
The term civil conflict encompasses a wide array of violent episodes, from isolated clashes 
between government and rebel groups to the loss of 10 percent of a country’s lives as in 
Rwanda. Even less extreme instances on which the body of knowledge on the microeconomic 
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impact of conflict is based are of comparatively high magnitude, such as Guatemala, where 
200,000 people died and 8.3 percent of the population were displaced (Chamarbagwala and 
Morán, 2011) and Tajikistan, where between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in a year, about 10 
percent of the population was displaced, and 80 percent of the country's industry destroyed 
(Shemyakina, forthcoming). Although some conflict years exceeded the 1,000 battle-deaths 
threshold commonly used to define civil war, Nepal’s armed conflict was one of moderate 
intensity, and so an interesting case study towards an understanding of the magnitude of conflict 
effects across the conflict intensity spectrum. 
The question of the impact of the Nepalese civil conflict is especially intriguing in the face of 
the contradictions highlighted in qualitative accounts between, on the one hand, the destruction 
brought about by the conflict, and, on the other hand, positive, often unintended, consequences 
of the insurgency. Shedding light on the impact of this civil conflict episode is particularly 
interesting given the rapid economic development experienced by the country as a whole. The 
development record of Nepal during the conflict is puzzling on more than one account. Conflict 
theory and evidence suggest that slow growth and poverty are favorable to conflict (so that 
sustained growth is expected to decrease the duration of the conflict), and that conflict has 
adverse consequences on poverty and growth (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). In particular, one 
would expect exposure to conflict to be detrimental to household income and wealth due to war-
related disruption, destruction and looting, and thus in turn to investments in human capital. The 
positive national trends with respect to aggregate development indicators are compatible with 
two hypotheses: (1) the conflict has tamed down, but not prevented growth and development; 
and (2) positive changes brought about by the insurgency (either directly or as an unintended 
byproduct) have more than compensated the adverse effects of the conflict. If (1) applies, then 
one would expect to find that, at the sub-national level, socio-economic outcomes such as 
education did not improve as much where there was more fighting. If this is not the case, then 
either (2) prevails or the conflict has only tamed down growth and development through 
macroeconomic channels that affected the whole country, and which could only be appraised 
under very strong assumptions regarding the national counterfactual of Nepal in the absence of 
conflict. 
In this paper, I rely on within- and between-district variation in the intensity of violence to 
investigate differential changes in primary educational attainment, school enrollment, completed 
years of education, and the probability of being married across districts experiencing varying 
degrees of violence, in order to test the above hypotheses. 
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4. Data and Estimation Strategy 
4.1.  Data 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been carried out in a number of 
developing countries as part of the Measure DHS project, a reputable USAID-funded project 
aimed essentially at providing detailed, reliable information on fertility, family planning, 
maternal and child health and mortality. The second and third DHS carried out in Nepal took 
place in 2001 and 2006, respectively, and are repeated cross-sections, not panel data. In 
2001, six out of 257 sampling units had to be dropped from the sample for security reasons 
(Ministry of Health et al., 2002, p.6). But in 2006, conflict was nearly over everywhere, and 
so data collection could proceed without hindrance. 
For each DHS, a national sample of households is first interviewed using a household 
questionnaire collecting usual individual demographic and education data, as well as 
household-level socio-economic information such as ownership of durable goods and 
housing materials. The demographic characteristics of individual members are then used to 
determine which members are eligible for individual interviews, namely all women aged 15-
49 (DHS 2006) or all ever-married women aged 15-49 (DHS 2001), as well as a subset of 
males aged 15-59. The data used for the education analysis comes from the household 
questionnaire, whereas that used for the marriage study comes from individual interviews 
with eligible women. 
Summary statistics, by district conflict intensity and specification subsample, can be 
found in Table 3. 
Another national dataset carried out in Nepal during the relevant period is the Nepalese 
Living Standard Survey (NLSS) of 2003/2004. Given the timing of the conflict, the DHS is 
generally more useful for the present analysis since data collection occurred later. As a 
consequence, the outcomes of interest (namely, education and marriage) are more likely to 
be realized for cohorts exposed to the conflict in 2006 than in 2003/2004. In addition, since 
the conflict was raging at the time of the NLSS data collection, there were more difficulties 
with data collection than in the 2006 DHS. Finally, we need to focus on specific cohorts to 
identify the effect of exposure to the conflict, and so the larger sample sizes provided by the 
DHS are particularly valuable. Nevertheless, one advantage of the NLSS over the DHS is 
that the NLSS collected data on the individual’s district of origin before migrating to the 
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place where he or she is surveyed. The DHS only has data on the date at which individuals 
interviewed individually moved to their current place of residence. This information is not 
available for household members not eligible for an individual interview, and so it is not 
applicable to the sample used in the education analysis. In the next section, I explain how I 
can nonetheless check the robustness of my education findings based on DHS data to 
conflict-related migration. 
The NLSS data on the individual’s district of origin before they last migrated is 
particularly useful in the marriage analysis, since in Nepal, as in most of South Asia, 
marriage is patrilocal. Marriage is therefore often accompanied by migration, not 
uncommonly to a different district, and so this may create both classical and non-classical 
measurement error in the district-level conflict measures used here. In particular, if when 
conflict was very intense, parents used marriage as a way of putting their daughters to safety 
by marrying them to men from more peaceful districts, this may create an artificially positive 
correlation between being married and being observed in a low-conflict intensity district. 
Therefore, when analyzing the impact of conflict on marriage, I present estimation results 
using data from both the DHS and the NLSS.
1
 
The data used to measure conflict intensity are taken from electronic files provided by 
the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), an independent, well-regarded, human rights 
NGO based in Kathmandu and with representatives in each of the 75 Nepalese districts, who 
monitor human rights violations. Data from INSEC has been extensively used in the media, 
international agencies and government reports, and in a number of academic studies, 
including Bohara et al. (2006) and Do and Iyer (2010). The INSEC data files contain the 
number of conflict-related deaths per month per district of Nepal between February 1996 and 
December 2006, as well as the total number of school destructions and abductions by 
Maoists at the district level, which are used to construct most measures of exposure to 
conflict used in this paper. 
I also use two indicators of Maoist control over the district by 2003, based on 
classifications reported by Hattlebak (2007). I consider in turn two alternative definitions of 
Maoist control. I first categorize as under Maoist control any district that is categorized as 
such by both Maoists and the government (Definition 1). I then apply what Hattlebak (2007) 
considers the more reliable classification of the two, namely the government classification 
(Definition 2). The definition of all the conflict exposure variables used in this paper can be 
found in Table 1. 
                                                          
1
 NLSS Data was provided by the Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
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Table 1 goes about here 
 
 
4.2. Estimation Strategy 
All the analyses described below rely on within-district variation in exposure to conflict and 
are thus robust to correlation between the intensity of conflict at the district level and any other 
time-invariant characteristics of the district that also influence the explained variable. Although 
specifications vary, the approach is essentially of the difference-in-difference type. The main 
threat to identification is therefore the possibility that time-varying omitted factors may be 
correlated both with the left-hand-side variable and conflict exposure. 
Research on the causes of the Nepalese conflict summarised in Section 3 has shown that 
conflict was more intense in more mountainous and forested regions, and up until 2002, in 
poorer areas. These characteristics are also likely to have an effect on education and the marriage 
market and it is therefore essential to control for regional differences. This is done in several 
ways. First, the inclusion of district fixed effects ensures that any time-invariant differences in 
the explained variable between districts with different degrees of conflict are differenced-out. 
Second, all regressions include region-specific time dummies, i.e., for each year except the first 
one, which is the omitted category, there are five dummies corresponding to each of the five 
development regions of Nepal. Figures in World Bank (2005, p.6) show that poverty has 
decreased at a different pace across these five regions, and this may confound the effect of 
conflict if the intensity of violence is caused not only by levels but also by trends in poverty. The 
region-specific time dummies fully capture these different regional trends, and imply that the 
source of identification of the effect of conflict is the variation in conflict intensity within 
development region, net of district-specific constant characteristics and time-varying 
characteristics that are common to all districts in a given region. Third, I test for the presence of 
differential pre-conflict trends correlated with future conflict, which is equivalent to carrying out 
a series of placebo experiments. Fourth, I use several identification strategies, relying, in turn, on 
(i) a comparison of cohorts that are exposed (treated) and not exposed (control) to conflict, and 
(ii) a comparison of outcomes for individuals of a given age observed just before the conflict 
escalated (in 2001) and at the end of the conflict (2006), thus comparing individuals born only 
five years apart but experiencing very different conflict intensity. 
Two issues of particular concern when estimating the impact of any conflict episode are 
mortality selection and migration. In the case of Nepal, the number of conflict-related deaths was 
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sufficiently small to rule out mortality selection as an important source of bias. With less than 1 
percent of the population forcibly displaced, the sample selection bias potentially caused by 
forced migration is not as high as in many other conflict situations, but should not be ignored. 
More importantly, Nepal has seen growing numbers of voluntary migration over the past decade, 
and these migration patterns may well be correlated with conflict intensity. Since conflict 
intensity is measured at the district level in this paper, migration within district does not pose 
any estimation issues. In their case study of Chitwan, Bohra-Mishra and Massey (forthcoming) 
find that conflict-related violence does not increase the probability of migration outside the 
district, but the experience in Chitwan is unlikely to be representative of the whole country. I 
tackle the migration issue in several ways, depending on data availability. In the marriage 
analysis, migration bias is likely to be particularly severe since women move to the place of 
residence of their groom upon marrying, which could be in a different district. Even if these 
movements were unrelated to conflict intensity, classical measurement error in exposure to 
conflict would lead to attenuation bias. Therefore, I provide estimates for the whole DHS sample 
as well as for the sample of women who, at the start of the conflict in 1996, already lived where 
they are interviewed in 2006. I also provide a robustness check in which I use the NLSS, and so 
can construct the conflict exposure variable on the basis of conflict-related casualties in the 
district of residence year by year. In the education analysis, there may also be a migration bias 
when education outcomes are observed at an age at which some individuals may have migrated 
away from the district. One of the specifications addresses this concern by comparing the change 
in educational outcomes for individuals aged 14 or younger, between the 2001 DHS and the 
2006 DHS. At such a young age, voluntary migration is extremely unlikely to have occurred. 
 
Education 
a. Specification 1: Plain difference-in-difference 
This specification corresponds to the most traditional case of difference-in-difference. I 
define two cohorts, one not exposed to conflict (“control”) and one exposed to conflict 
(“treated”), and compare the difference in primary attainment between these two cohorts and 
across districts characterised by different levels of conflict intensity.  
An inspection of the data shows that, although the legal age for the start of schooling is 6 
years old and there are five years of primary schooling, a sizeable proportion of children is 
enrolled in primary school before 6 (70.1% at 5) and until 14 (16.1%) in the 2006 DHS, with 
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numbers decreasing sharply afterwards (7.9% at 15 and 2.85% at 16).
2
 Therefore, an analysis of 
the effect of conflict on primary schooling attainment should consider children aged 14 or more 
at the time of the survey, and control cohorts should have been at least 15 at the beginning of the 
conflict, and preferably slightly older. I define the treated cohort as comprising individuals aged 
5 to 9 years old at the start of the conflict in 1996, so that all treated cohorts are exposed to the 
conflict during most of their potential primary schooling career and the youngest exposed cohort 
is observed at age 14 in the 2006 DHS. The control cohorts include individuals aged 16 to 19 at 
the start of the conflict. I exclude cohorts aged 10 to 15 in 1996, as the treatment status of these 
cohorts is less clear-cut: many of these individuals could have been enrolled in primary 
schooling during the conflict, but they were not exposed to conflict during their whole primary 
schooling careers. 
More specifically I estimate the following equation using the fixed effects estimator, and 
using data from the 2006 DHS: 
 
Y ijrt = β1 districtj + β2 regionr*yeart + β3 (cohortt*casualtiesj) + ε ijt  (1) 
Where Y ijrt is a dummy equal to one if the individual has completed primary education, and zero 
otherwise; districtj is a set of district fixed effects, and regionr*yeart are a set of interaction terms 
between binary indicators for each of Nepal’s five development regions and a set of birth year 
dummies yeart (excluding the first year). cohortt*casualtiesj is the interaction between a dummy 
equal to one when the individual belongs to the treatment cohort and the number of conflict-
related casualties (per 1000 inhabitants) in district j during 1996-2006. 
Under the assumption that there is no correlation between the number of district casualties 
and unobserved district-time-varying factors (after controlling for region-specific year fixed 
effects), β3 identifies the average treatment effect of exposure to conflict on those exposed. 
I also estimate variants of Equation (1) in which I add a regressor capturing specific aspects 
of the conflict which are likely to have affected schooling outcomes. I include, in turn, the total 
number of school destructions (per 1000 inhabitants) during the conflict, and the number of 
abductions by Maoist forces (per 1000 inhabitants) during the conflict. In addition, I consider 
whether Maoist control over the district had an effect on primary attainment by estimating 
variants of Equation (1) in which I replace the casualties measure by an indicator variable 
switching on when the district was under Maoist control. 
                                                          
2
 In the 2001 DHS, 44.4% of 5-year olds, 24.6% of 14 year olds, and 13.6% of 15 year olds are enrolled in primary 
schooling. 
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Household characteristics should not be included as regressors because these are only 
observed at the time of the survey, not at the time of exposure to conflict. 
 
 
 
 
b. Specification 2: Comparison of cohorts experiencing the same total exposure to conflict, 
but at different periods in their lives 
 
An alternative identification strategy is to compare the outcomes of individuals, who despite 
having been exposed, during their potential primary schooling life, to the same degree of violent 
conflict, have experienced a different intensity of conflict at a given age. The timing of exposure 
is likely to matter: the existing microeconometric evidence on the impact of conflict on 
education indeed indicates that the effect of exposure to conflict varies with age at exposure. I 
therefore estimate the following equation: 
 
Yijrt = θ1 districtj + θ2 regionr*year t + θ3 casualties_6_10jt + θ4 casualties_11_14jt+ ε ijrt     (2) 
Where Yijrt, districtj and regionr*yeart are defined as in Equation (1), casualties_age-_age
+
jt 
is the number of conflict-related casualties per 1000 inhabitants in district j during the years 
included in a moving window defined by age- and age
+
 in the life of an individual born in year t.  
 
c. Specification 3: Comparison of outcomes in 2001 and 2006 for a given age 
An alternative way of considering the effect of exposure to conflict is to compare the change 
in outcomes (e.g., completed years of education) between two surveys for a given age at 
interview, for districts with a more or less pronounced intensification of conflict between the two 
surveys. By using two surveys relatively close in time, such as the 2001 and 2006 DHS’s, this 
approach also has the advantage of comparing cohorts that are only five years apart, which 
reduces concerns over potential confounders. Furthermore, when the sample is restricted to 
children under 14 years old, the concern over selection bias due to voluntary migration vanishes. 
More specifically, I estimate models of the form: 
 
 Yijrt = γ1 districtj + γ2 aget + γ3 regionr*aget*dhs2006  
+ γ4 (conflict_by_surveyjt) [+ XijrtГ]+ ε ijrt  
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Where Yijrt is, in turn, the primary schooling completion dummy, an indicator for enrollment 
status, and the number of completed years of education. aget is a set of dummies for the age of 
the index individual at the time of the survey, dhs2006 is a dummy equal to one for 2006 DHS 
observations and zero for 2001 DHS observations, and conflict_by_surveyjt is the total number of 
conflict-related deaths at the district level, per 1000 inhabitants, up to the (Nepali) year in which 
the bulk of the survey data was collected. The inclusion of region and age-specific dummies for 
the change in outcome between the two surveys controls comprehensively for potential region-
specific, time-varying confounding factors, allowing these to vary by age group. Xijrt is a vector 
of household characteristics (binary indicator for rural location, and dummies for the educational 
attainment of the household head
3
). In general, the inclusion of covariates that explain a sizeable 
share of the variation in the outcome variable tends to increase the precision of the estimate of 
the treatment effect (Duflo et al., 2008). However, the inclusion of socioeconomic household 
regressors may cloud the interpretation of the effect of conflict intensity because the latter may 
have an effect on the former. Therefore, I focus my attention on largely predetermined variables. 
 
Marriage 
Given the short time elapsed between the start of the conflict and the latest data available (10 
years), it is not possible to estimate the impact of conflict during primary school age on long 
term marital status. For instance, an individual aged 5 at the beginning of the conflict is only 14 
or 15 years old at the time of the 2006 DHS survey. It is however possible to estimate the impact 
of exposure to conflict during primary schooling age on early marriage, e.g., on the probability 
of being married by the age of 15 years old. 
It is also relevant to analyze the effect of exposure to conflict during core marriageable age 
(15 to 20 years old for Nepalese women) on long-term marital status. I therefore carry out a 
separate analysis considering the impact of exposure to conflict during marriageable age on 
marriage by age 21, at which over 80 percent of women are married (Figure 1). 
I start by estimating Equation (1), where Yijrt is now a dummy variable equal to one if the 
woman was married at age 15 or younger, and zero otherwise, and where casualtiesj is the 
number of casualties (per 1000 inhabitants) during 1996-2004
4
. The only difference with the 
treated and control cohorts used in the primary education analysis is that individuals aged 5 at 
                                                          
3
 More household characteristics such as female headship, asset ownership, and dwelling materials are available, but 
these are excluded as they are more likely to be caused by conflict. 
4
 The Western Calendar is used here for the convenience of the reader. In the analysis, the cut-off point is the end of 
Nepalese year 2060 (April 2004), which coincides with the bulk of data collection for the 2003/2004 NLSS. 
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the start of the conflict are dropped, since they are only 14 at the time of the 2006 survey and so 
not eligible to be interviewed individually. 
I then estimate the effect of exposure to conflict during marriageable age in a similar 
specification, but modifying the definitions of the dependent variable, and of the treated and 
control cohorts accordingly. The exposed cohort comprises individuals aged 13 to 17 years old 
at the start of the conflict in 1996 and the control cohort comprises those aged 23 to 27 in 1996. 
This is based on the observation that marriages tend to start taking place in the mid-teens and 
that, at the time of the 2006 DHS, all women in the treated cohort were 21 or older. Therefore, 
the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if the index woman was married by the age of 21 
to account for the right-truncation of the marriage variable. The youngest woman included in the 
control cohort was aged 23 at the start of the conflict, so that the outcome of interest (whether 
married by 21) was realised before the start of the conflict for this cohort. When using NLSS 
data, I keep the same definitions for the treated and control cohorts, but given the earlier date of 
the survey, the treated cohort is observed at a younger age. Therefore, I consider the probability 
of marriage by 18 years old instead. 
All specifications are estimated using district fixed-effects panel data models, and all models 
allow for residuals to be correlated in an arbitrary fashion within district to avoid over-rejection 
of the null hypothesis of zero treatment effect due to serial correlation, following Bertrand et al. 
(2004). All outcome variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 goes about here 
 
Test of pre-conflict differences in trends 
The main threat to identification in a difference-in-difference setting is the potential for 
unobserved time-varying omitted factors correlated with the treatment. It is impossible to test 
whether there are such omitted variables coinciding precisely with the treatment at hand. But one 
can test whether there were differences in time-varying unobservables correlated with future 
conflict variables before the conflict began. I test for differences in pre-conflict trends correlated 
with future conflict intensity by running regressions of the form: 
 
Y ijrt =δ1 districtj + δ2 yeart + δ3 (pre_conflict_yeart*conflictj) + ε ijrt  (4) 
 
where yeart are year of birth dummies, pre_conflict_yeart is the set of year dummies 
corresponding to the five youngest cohorts who could not be affected by the conflict, and 
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conflictj is any of the conflict measures used in the paper. I run these regressions on the sample 
of the last 10 birth year cohorts not affected by the conflict for the outcome of interest. More 
specifically, in the primary education and early marriage analyses, the sample comprises 
individuals aged 15 to 24 at the start of the conflict. In the analysis of marriage by 21 years old, 
the sample comprises individuals aged 22 to 31 at the start of the conflict. I test for the joint 
significance of the δ3’s (using an F-test), which corresponds to a test of differences in pre-
conflict trends correlated with future conflict intensity. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Graphical Analysis and Tests for Pre-conflict Differential Trends 
Figures 5 to 8 plot trends in primary schooling completion and marriage, by conflict intensity 
district groups. An inspection of Figures 5 and 6 show a sustained increase over time in the 
proportion of individuals completing primary education. The upward trend is particularly 
marked for females, indicating a decrease in educational gender inequality. Three groups of 
districts are plotted separately, according to the tercile of the distribution of district conflict 
casualties (per 1000 inhabitants) into which they fall. A comparison of the rate of improvement 
by conflict intensity tercile suggests that districts where conflict was more intense had lower 
male and female primary schooling rates pre-conflict compared to low-conflict intensity 
districts, but have tended to catch up since then, especially for females, for whom they have now 
overtaken the low-conflict intensity group. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 go about here 
 
Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the catching up started for children who were not exposed to the 
conflict during their entire primary schooling period, but who, at the start of the conflict, were 
still at an age at which many Nepalese children are enrolled in primary school (e.g., 24.6% of 14 
year olds were enrolled in primary schooling in 2001). One concern is that part of the catching up 
observed in these graphs, where districts are aggregated according to conflict intensity, may be 
due to differential pre-conflict trends in primary schooling attainment across districts with 
varying conflict intensity. I test whether this is the case by estimating variants of Equation (4) on 
the sample of children aged 15 to 24 in 1996.  
Table A-1 presents results from a regression of Equation (4), where Yijrt is an indicator for 
primary schooling completion, and conflictj is the main conflict intensity measure used in this 
paper, namely the number of total district conflict casualties per 1000 inhabitants. The 
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interaction terms between each of the five youngest cohorts are not jointly significant, indicating 
the absence of differential pre-conflict trends between districts with different degrees of conflict 
intensity. The coefficient on each interaction term can be interpreted as a placebo experiment 
identifying the differential change over time in primary completion rates for a given untreated 
cohort, between districts with varying (future) conflict intensity. The coefficient on the 
interaction term for women aged 18 in 1996 is statistically significantly negative, indicating that 
this cohort has a lower primary schooling completion rate relative to older cohorts, in districts 
where there was more fighting relative to districts with less fighting. This implies that the 
estimated effect of conflict on the treated cohort in Equation (1) may be biased downwards (i.e., 
be more negative than the true effect). As we shall see in the next subsection, this bias cannot 
affect the sign of my estimate, since I find a significantly positive effect. 
Table A-2 reports tests of pre-conflict differential trends when conflictj is, in turn, each of the 
additional conflict intensity measures used in the paper. In the case of Maoist abductions and 
Maoist control (for males and under definition 1), there is evidence of differential pre-conflict 
trends. However, in all cases, the direction of the pre-conflict differential trend goes in the 
opposite direction to the estimated effects of conflict presented in the next section, so that the 
magnitude of the reported effects is likely a lower bound for the true magnitude of the effect. For 
instance, in Column (4) we see that the second youngest male non-treated cohort has a lower 
primary completion rate in districts where there were more abductions. The pre-conflict 
differential trend would therefore tend to overestimate the magnitude of any negative effect of 
abductions on male primary schooling. The reverse is true for three of the female cohorts, as 
shown in Column (3). As we are about to see, I find that abductions have a negative effect on 
female schooling, but not on male schooling, whereas the pre-conflict trend differential works 
against male schooling, but in favor of female schooling. The pre-conflict differences are 
therefore unlikely to be driving my findings on the effect of abductions. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 go about here 
 
Figure 7 shows that the occurrence of early marriage has decreased over time. Before the 
conflict, fewer women tended to be married by age 15 in the high conflict intensity district group 
compared to low intensity districts, but early marriage rates seem roughly similar across conflict 
intensity terciles for cohorts exposed to the conflict during primary schooling age. 
A similar pattern emerges from Figure 8 for marriage by 21 years old. Over 80 percent of 
women are married by this age over the period. Still, the marriage rate at 21 years old tended to 
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be lower in high conflict-intensity districts before the conflict, and this rate has decreased faster 
in the low-conflict intensity district group. 
Table A-3 tests for differences in pre-conflict marriage and early marriage trends. Pre-
conflict early marriage trends do not differ systematically across districts more or less affected 
by conflict. However, the rate of marriage by 21 years old tends to increase somewhat faster 
before the conflict in districts which experienced more conflict-related casualties. This would 
tend to lead estimates of Equation (1) to bias upwards the effect of conflict intensity on marriage 
by 21 years old. There is a significant correlation between pre-conflict, year to year variation in 
the rate of marriage by 21 years old and future Maoist abductions, but the direction of the 
differential “trend” is unclear. 
Having established that pre-conflict trends are unlikely to drive my estimates of the impact of 
conflict on primary education and early marriage, but that the long-term marriage analysis may 
suffer from some bias, I now turn to the difference-in-difference estimation results. 
 
5.2. Education 
The inspection of Figures 5 and 6 suggested that inequality in primary schooling 
achievement between districts which experienced different degrees of conflict intensity has 
tended to decrease with the onset of the insurgency, and especially so for girls. In Tables 4 to 7, I 
present estimates of the impact of exposure to conflict on educational outcomes to check 
whether the conclusion of the graphical analysis is confirmed when controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity between individual districts and between regions over time, and when using 
different identification strategies. 
 
Table 4 goes about here 
 
Table 4 reports findings on the impact of conflict exposure on primary education attainment. 
The first two columns of Table 4 present estimates of the long-term effect of conflict intensity on 
primary schooling completion, using the baseline difference-in-difference specification 
(Equation 1). The last two columns of Table 4 test the robustness of these findings by comparing 
the change in primary completion rates at any given age between 10 and 18 years old, for 
districts with varying degrees of conflict intensification between the 2001 and 2006 DHS 
surveys (Equation 3). Columns (3) and (4) explore the long-term impact of conflict intensity 
experienced up to- and after 10 years old (Equation 2). 
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The results in the first column indicate that areas with more fighting have seen a larger 
increase in female primary attainment. Casting this result in terms of the distribution of conflict 
violence, this implies that an increase in violence by one standard deviation of the district-level 
distribution of casualties during the conflict (0.98 casualties per 1000 inhabitants) increases 
female primary schooling attainment by 5.6 percentage points. Put differently, this is roughly the 
effect of a dramatic move from the 5
th
 to the 75
th
 percentiles of the district-level conflict 
distribution of total casualties. The sign of this effect is confirmed when comparing cohorts born 
only five years apart observed at the same age (between 10 and 18 years old) in 2001 and 2006 
(Column 5), although this effect is somewhat larger but less precisely estimated and so only 
marginally significant. When investigating separately exposure to conflict at ages 6-10, the 
“normal” primary schooling age when over 80% of children are enrolled in primary school 
(author’s calculations based on DHS 2006 data) and at 11-14, when the share enrolled decreases 
sharply from 70.5% to 16.1%, neither conflict exposure coefficient is statistically significant, nor 
are these coefficients statistically significantly different from each other. 
Across all specifications in Table 4, conflict exposure does not appear to affect male primary 
schooling completion. 
The estimates reviewed so far suggest that any positive factor contributing to an increase in 
female educational attainment is broadly common to all girls aged 6-14, which rules out an 
explanation due to a reduction in the incidence of early marriage and indicates that, although 
parents may be reluctant to send young female teenagers to school due to the risk of sexual 
violence, this effect is compensated by other channels favorable to girl schooling, as otherwise 
one would expect that conflict experienced while 11-14 would tend to decrease educational 
attainment. The results in Table 4 also suggest that such favorable factors are not shared equally 
by boys. Although boys are more likely to be recruited by the insurgents, this is unlikely to be 
affecting children under the age of 11, and so the results from column (4) showing no effect of 
the conflict at age 6-10 on primary attainment do not give support to the hypothesis that Maoists 
may have encouraged schooling for all, e.g., due to their “view that schooling is essential to the 
creation of a new generation of enlightened revolutionaries” (Hart, 2001, p.33), their sometimes 
mentioned role in enforcing attendance of teachers and other government employees (Hart, 
2001; Collins, 2006), or overall encouragement of education among deprived ethnic minorities. 
 
Table 5 goes about here 
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Estimates of Equations (1) and (2) have the advantage of shedding light on the long-term 
effect of the conflict on primary education. However, by focusing only on individuals who are 
generally old enough to have finished primary schooling (i.e., are aged 14 or older at the time of 
the 2006 DHS), we introduce the risk that estimates may be biased due to migration. An 
alternative strategy is to compare the educational attainment of children too young to have 
migrated away from the district for work or marriage, between 2001 and 2006 using Equation 
(3). By focusing on children under 14 years old, these estimates may not capture the long-term 
effect of conflict, but they are unlikely to be much affected by migration patterns. In addition, 
since we also observe household characteristics at the time of survey, it is possible to gain 
precision by including time-invariant household covariates.
5
 
 
Table 6 goes about here 
 
Findings for children aged between 5 and 14 years old at the time of the survey are presented 
in Table 6. Column (1) of Table 6 indicates that an increase in violence by one standard 
deviation increases completed years of education by about one quarter of a year, for girls aged 5 
to 14 in 2006 compared to girls from the same district who were the same age when surveyed in 
2001 before the conflict escalated. However, there is no discernible effect on enrollment, and no 
effect on either outcome for boys. The combination of improved accumulation of years of 
education for females without evidence of increased enrollment suggests that the channel 
through which girls obtained more education is through an increase in the speed at which they 
accumulate years of education.
6
 
Results in Table 7 are obtained in the same way as those in Table 6, but for the subgroup of 
individuals aged 15 to 18 at the time of the survey. This sample is more likely to be selected due 
to migration patterns, but it is interesting to note that females in heightened conflict areas appear 
to make educational gains at this more advanced age too.  
 
Table 7 goes about here 
 
In Table 5, I investigate whether specific aspects of the conflict had different effects on 
primary schooling completion, and test the hypothesis that Maoist rule over a district may have 
                                                          
5
 Conclusions are unchanged when these regressors are excluded. Results are available upon request. 
6
 When estimating Equation (3) on a dummy indicating progression to the next grade, for the sample of children 
enrolled in school at the time of the survey, I find a statistically significant, positive effect of conflict intensity. 
Results are available upon request. 
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been favorable to female schooling. First, I use INSEC data on the total number of school 
destructions per district to test whether such destructions had an effect on primary schooling 
completion (Columns 1 and 2). For both genders I find a statistically insignificant effect, which 
is likely due to the fact that a district-level analysis lacks power in identifying the effect of 
school destructions. School destructions were a rare and isolated aspect of the conflict,
 7
 which 
one would expect to have had a large effect on schooling at a very disaggregated level. But this 
effect is unlikely to be captured by an analysis carried out at the district level, unless school 
destructions are correlated with characteristics of the conflict relevant at the district level, such 
as the use of schools as army barracks (Hart, 2001; Caddell, 2007). Second, I use INSEC data on 
the total number of abductions by Maoists per district to test whether a larger number of 
abductions, often targeted at school children, had an adverse effect on schooling. Results in 
Columns (3) and (4) indicate that abductions had a negative effect on female primary schooling. 
An increase in the number of abductions (per 1000 inhabitants) by one standard deviation 
(16.82) decreases female primary schooling attainment by 3.7 percentage points. Put differently, 
the effect of a dramatic move from the 5
th
 to the 75
th
 percentiles of the district-level distribution 
of total abductions is a decrease of 1.6 percentage points in female primary completion. Third, I 
test whether primary schooling completion improved more in districts controlled by Maoists, 
and thus where the insurgents were better able to affect schooling provision according to their 
ideology (Columns 5 to 8). There is no clear-cut definition of control by the insurgents, with 
discrepancies between the classifications used by the People’s Army and the government 
(Hatlebakk, 2007), and so I use two alternative classifications. In Columns (5) and (6), I consider 
controlled by the Maoists only those districts recognized as such by both the Maoists and the 
government. In Columns (7) and (8), I use the government’s classification, which includes more 
districts and is somewhat more convincing according to Hatlebakk (2007). The choice of 
definition affects the magnitude and significance of estimates, but altogether the message is that 
primary schooling became more prevalent over time in areas controlled by the Maoists, for both 
genders. 
Caution should however prevail when interpreting the findings on Maoist abductions. Since 
these abductions specifically targeted school children and teachers, abductions are more likely to 
be correlated with unobserved variables that are also correlated with schooling outcomes. There 
may even be reverse causality of an ambiguous direction running from educational attainment to 
abductions. On the one hand, abductions may be more likely where educational attainment is 
higher (e.g., if Maoists target schools in areas where attendance is high to abduct large numbers 
                                                          
7
 76 schools were destroyed according to the data provided by INSEC. 
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of students at once, or if they target brighter students, as was “widely believed” according to 
Hogg (2006, p.18)). On the other hand, abductions may be more likely where abductees are 
more likely to join the Maoists forces, and so the People’s Army may have disproportionately 
abducted children from areas which were lagging behind. There are also some surprising figures 
in the abductions data provided by INSEC, such as a total of only 284 abductions by Maoists in 
Rolpa during the whole conflict. 
Taken together, the results presented in this section give no support to the hypothesis that the 
Nepalese civil conflict had a negative effect on schooling overall. There is a robust but small 
positive effect of the intensity of the insurgency on female educational attainment. This effect is 
not accompanied by an increase in the probability of enrollment in education, suggesting that the 
positive effect on attainment is driven by a faster progression from one grade to the next rather 
than an increase in enrollment. There is also suggestive evidence of a small decrease in female 
primary schooling completion where insurgents were more prone to abductions. Finally, districts 
controlled by Maoists have tended to experience larger primary schooling gains over the period, 
for both genders. 
 
5.3. Marriage 
Table 8 presents results from regressions of the probability of being married by the age of 15, 
for women interviewed individually in the 2006 DHS, restricting (Columns (2) and (4)) or not 
(Columns (1) and (3)) the sample to women who were already living in the place where they 
were interviewed at the start of the conflict. The regressions corresponding to the first two 
columns consider the impact of overall conflict intensity during 1996-2006 as measured by 
conflict-related casualties. The regressions in the two last columns further include an interaction 
term between the treatment cohort indicator and the total number of abductions by Maoists (per 
1000 inhabitants).  
Table 8 goes about here 
 
When women are assigned the conflict exposure corresponding to the district in which they 
are surveyed, irrespective of whether they already lived in the same place in 1996, fighting 
intensity does not appear to affect the probability of early marriage (Column 1). However, 
consistent with the idea that restricting the sample to women who have not moved since the 
beginning of the conflict reduces measurement error, the magnitude of the effect of conflict 
intensity increases and becomes statistically significant in Column (2). Adding the abductions 
variable in Column (3) shows a very significant increase in the probability of early marriage due 
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to abductions. When restricting the sample to women who have not moved since 1996, the 
coefficients for both conflict variables become larger, the effect of the casualties variable 
becomes significant, but is smaller than in Column (2), which suggests that some of the effect 
captured by casualties in Column (2) is due to the correlation of casualties with abductions. The 
results in Column (4) indicate that moving from the 5
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the casualties 
(abductions) distribution leads to an increase of 7.1 (2.7) percentage points in the probability of 
being married by age 15. Taking these results back to the findings on education, it is interesting 
to remark that, although overall conflict intensity appears to have had a small positive effect on 
female schooling attainment, it has tended to increase the probability of early marriage. This 
may explain why female enrollment has not increased despite the increase in attainment. 
 
Table 9 goes about here 
 
Table 9 presents findings on the impact of conflict during marriageable age. All columns 
except Column (3) refer to regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the woman is 
married by the age of 21 and zero otherwise, using data from the 2006 DHS. Column (3) 
exploits the richer migration data available in the NLSS 2003/2004, and focuses on the same 
treated and control cohorts as in the 2006 DHS analysis. In order to account for the fact that the 
youngest cohort is observed three years before the age at which they are surveyed in the 2006 
DHS, in this specification I consider the effect of conflict on the probability of being married by 
the age of 18. Women whose entry in the marriage market coincided with the start of the conflict 
are no more or less likely to be married by the age of 21, when more than 80 percent of Nepalese 
women are married (Figure 1). No significant difference is noticeable already by age 18, even 
when exposure to conflict is calculated year by year, according to district of residence in each 
year (Column 3). Maoist abductions do not appear to have affected the probability of marriage 
by 21 years old for women who were entering the marriage market at the beginning of the 
conflict. 
One potential concern with the estimates in Table 9 is that, for women who entered the 
marriage market at the beginning of conflict, the height of the conflict may have occurred too 
late in their life to affect their marriage prospects one way or the other. However, a similar 
conclusion is reached when estimating an alternative specification in which all women aged 13 
to 27 at the start of the conflict are included and (cohortt*casualtiesj) is replaced with the 
number of casualties while the index woman is aged 13 to 21.
8
 
                                                          
8
 Results not reported here for conciseness, but available upon request. 
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6. Conclusion 
Despite having gone through a moderately high intensity civil conflict between 1996 and 
2006, Nepal as a whole has surprisingly enjoyed one of the best periods in its history in terms of 
economic growth and poverty reduction, among others. So far, however, little is known about 
whether this period of development at the aggregate level hides disparities at a more 
disaggregated level, due to the wide variation in conflict intensity across the country. In addition, 
no study to date has aimed at investigating econometrically whether such disparities may also 
apply along the gender divide. 
In this paper, I exploit within- and between- district variation in the intensity of violence to 
estimate the impact of conflict intensity on a range of schooling outcomes and on the probability 
of marriage at different ages. 
I find no support for the hypothesis that overall civil-conflict related violence, as measured 
by the number of conflict-related casualties, had a negative effect on schooling for children of 
either gender. There is robust evidence of a small, positive effect of conflict intensity on female 
educational attainment, but not on enrollment. Data limitations prevent a thorough investigation 
of the robustness of findings on the impact of other aspects of the conflict. With this caveat in 
mind, I find that districts controlled by Maoists also experienced larger primary schooling gains 
during the conflict period, for both genders. I also find that one aspect of the Nepalese civil 
conflict particularly relevant to schooling outcomes, namely the widespread insurgent practice of 
abducting civilians, had adverse consequences on female primary schooling. 
Women who were of schooling age during the conflict became more likely to be married by 
the age of 15 where fighting was more intense and where more abductions took place. This may 
contribute to explaining why, although female educational attainment improved faster where 
fighting was more intense, female school enrollment did not. Exposure to conflict during 
marriageable age, however, does not have a statistically significant effect on marriage status by 
the end of the main marriage period (i.e., by the age of 21). 
Female educational attainment may have benefited more from the societal changes induced 
directly or indirectly by the insurgency than it was adversely affected by loss of income and 
other disruptions caused by the conflict. Given that the positive effect on female education is 
driven not by increases in enrollment rates but by an increase in progression, it would suggest a 
role for an increase in the intensity of study by schoolgirls and/or a change in the behavior of 
teachers, rather than any Maoist influence in encouraging or coercing parents into sending girls 
to school. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to probe this hypothesis further, this 
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channel seems plausible in the light of existing narratives about the conflict and the influence 
that Maoists are reported to have had on very young children, with girls said to have been active 
within the Maoist ranks at as young an age as 12 or 13 (Manchanda, 2004). Indeed, according to 
Hart (2001), “(…) girls and women are strongly encouraged to gain an education and to 
participate in society generally and in activities connected to the “People’s War” in particular. 
This directly challenges their traditional role and apparently stimulates girls to consider leading 
lives beyond marriage and the home (Hart, 2001, p.35)”. 
However, girls who grew up in areas of more intense conflict were also more likely to be 
married at a very young age (15 and below), especially where the violence was accompanied by 
a large number of civilian abductions by Maoists, and so where parents may have been more 
concerned about the physical integrity of their young daughters. 
These findings are in line with the existing qualitative literature on the Nepalese civil 
conflict, which consistently reports mixed conclusions with respect to the impact of the conflict 
on education and female empowerment (e.g., Hart, 2001; Lama-Tamang, 2003; Manchanda, 
2004; Geiser, 2005; Ariño, 2010, Falch, 2010). 
From an international perspective, the present paper contributes to unpicking the complexity 
that lies behind the generic term of “civil conflict”. Idiosyncrasies of each conflict point to the 
need for more research into the impact of different conflicts, in order to shed light on the range 
of effects to be expected, rather than a focus on extreme, but thankfully rare, instances. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on electronic data files provided by the Informal Sector Service (INSEC). 
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Figure 3: Conflict Intensity across Districts of Nepal 
 
Author’s calculations using electronic casualties data files provided by the Informal Sector Service (INSEC). District terciles 
are defined by the distribution of total district casualties per 1000 inhabitants. District population figures are based on the 1996 
population census. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: Deaths and abductions are taken from electronic data files provided by the Informal Sector Service (INSEC). District 
population figures are based on the 1996 population census. 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, conflict-related casualties recorded by 
INSEC, and district population recorded in the 1996 Population Census. Conflict-intensity terciles are based on the district 
distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, conflict-related casualties recorded by 
INSEC, and district population recorded in the 1996 Population Census. Conflict-intensity terciles are based on the district 
distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
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Figure 7 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, conflict-related casualties recorded by 
INSEC, and district population recorded in the 1996 Population Census. Conflict-intensity terciles are based on the district 
distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, conflict-related casualties recorded by 
INSEC, and district population recorded in the 1996 Population Census. Conflict-intensity terciles are based on the district 
distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Definition of Conflict Variables 
Variable Definition 
cohortt Dummy equal to one when the individual belongs to the exposed cohort 
(definition depends on the variable of interest), and zero otherwise. Appears 
interacted with one of the five variables below: 
         *casualtiesj the total number of conflict-related casualties in district j during 1996-2006, per 
1000 inhabitants (as of the 1991 Census of Nepal, omitted hereafter) 
         *schooldestrj the total number of schools destroyed in district j during 1996-2006, per 1000 
inhabitants 
         *abductionsj the total number of abductions by Maoists in district j during 1996-2006, per 1000 
inhabitants 
            *control1j Dummy equal to one when the individual is in a district controlled by Maoists in 
2003 according to both the Maoists’ own classification and that used by the 
government, and zero otherwise. (Definition 1) 
            *control2j Dummy equal to one when the individual is in a district controlled by Maoists in 
2003 according to the government’s, and zero otherwise. (Definition 2) 
casualties_by_surveyjt Total number of conflict-related deaths at the district level, per 1000 inhabitants, 
from the (Nepali) year of birth to the year of the survey in which most data were 
collected (2001 DHS: 2057; 2006 DHS: 2062; NLSS: 2060) 
casualties_age1age2jt Number of conflict-related deaths at the district level, per 1000 inhabitants, during 
the period when the individual was aged between age1 and age2 (in turn, between 
6 and 10 and between 11 and 14). 
 
 
Table 2: Definition of Outcome Variables 
Variable Definition 
Primary  Dummy equal to one if the individual has completed primary education and zero 
otherwise. 
Years of education  Number of years of education completed by the individual at the time of interview. 
Enrolled  Dummy equal to one if the individual was enrolled in education at the time of the 
survey, and zero otherwise. 
Marriedby“age0”  Dummy equal to one if the individual was married by age0. Age0 varies according to 
the age of the youngest observation included in the sample (e.g., where the youngest 
person in the cohorts included in the regression is interviewed at 21 years old, the left-
hand-side variable is “marriedby21” to account for the truncated nature of the marriage 
information). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Conflict Casualties Tercile Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Panel A – Sample used to estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) in the primary attainment analysis 
=1 if primary education 0.769 0.562 0.743 0.545 0.742 0.511 
District casualties per 1000 0.265 0.270 0.647 0.642 1.564 1.549 
 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.160) (0.161) (0.958) (0.972) 
School destructions per 1000  0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Maoist abductions per 1000 1.135 1.301 11.890 11.411 5.131 4.904 
 
(2.515) (2.454) (27.159) (27.138) (5.482) (5.264) 
=1 if district controlled by  
Maoists (Definition 1) 
0.042 0.058 0.123 0.129 0.304 0.321 
=1 if district controlled by  
Maoists (Definition 2) 
0.102 0.122 0.357 0.337 0.541 0.554 
Age at interview 19.983 20.376 19.020 19.659 18.873 19.928 
 
(5.286) (5.327) (5.018) (5.098) (5.032) (5.220) 
=1 if DHS 2006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Observations 1264 1454 904 1122 887 1247 
Panel B - Sample used to estimate Eq. (3) in the years of education and enrollment analysis (all children aged 5 to 18) 
Years of education 2.887 2.405 2.841 2.372 2.763 2.338 
 
(3.060) (3.002) (2.900) (2.787) (2.856) (2.744) 
=1 if enrolled in schooling 0.758 0.631 0.806 0.678 0.798 0.664 
District casualties before survey 
per 1000 
0.132 0.134 0.316 0.321 0.680 0.699 
(0.150) (0.152) (0.329) (0.328) (0.714) (0.700) 
Age at interview 10.922 11.048 10.854 11.124 10.929 11.226 
 
(3.932) (3.991) (3.846) (3.969) (3.880) (3.966) 
=1 if DHS 2006 0.463 0.464 0.469 0.476 0.461 0.479 
=1 if rural 0.741 0.756 0.857 0.867 0.839 0.834 
Education of the household head: 
      
=1 if no education 0.430 0.447 0.416 0.455 0.433 0.464 
=1 if primary education 0.358 0.351 0.399 0.384 0.401 0.380 
=1 if secondary education 0.181 0.176 0.170 0.147 0.151 0.136 
=1 if higher education 0.031 0.026 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.021 
Observations 6088 5889 4842 5114 4607 4707 
Panel C - Sample used to estimate Eq. (1) in the early marriage analysis 
=1 if married by 15 years old 
 
0.207 
 
0.167 
 
0.190 
District casualties per 1000 
 
0.270 
 
0.654 
 
1.569 
  
(0.103) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(1.010) 
Maoist abductions per 1000 
 
1.348 
 
12.072 
 
5.002 
  
(2.641) 
 
(27.335) 
 
(5.397) 
Age at interview 
 
21.394 
 
20.307 
 
20.976 
  
(5.150) 
 
(4.959) 
 
(5.108) 
Observations 
 
1239 
 
928 
 
1050 
       
  
Continued on next page 
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Table 3 – continued: Summary Statistics 
Conflict Casualties Tercile Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Panel D – DHS Sample used to estimate Eq. (1) in the analysis of marriage by 21 years old 
=1 if married by 21 years old 
 
0.863 
 
0.870 
 
0.884 
District casualties per 1000 
 
0.272 
 
0.649 
 
1.519 
  
(0.101) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.883) 
Maoist abductions per 1000 
 
1.348 
 
12.927 
 
5.067 
  
(2.676) 
 
(29.516) 
 
(5.585) 
Age at interview 
 
28.112 
 
28.356 
 
28.526 
  
(5.084) 
 
(5.269) 
 
(5.114) 
Observations 
 
1259 
 
964 
 
955 
Definition of district controlled by Maoist based either on matches between People’s Army and government 
classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or based on government classification (Definition 2). 
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Table 4: Impact of Conflict Intensity Measured by Casualties on Primary Schooling Attainment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Overall 
Exposure 
Female 
Overall 
Exposure 
Male 
Exposure before 
and after 10 
Female 
Exposure before 
and after 10 
Male 
2001-2006 
Change 
Female 
2001-2006 
Change 
Male 
Outcome variable primary primary primary primary primary primary 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x total 
district casualties 
0.0555** 0.0241 
    
(0.0272) (0.0251) 
    
District casualties while 
age 6-10 
  
0.1067 0.0325 
  
  
(0.0773) (0.0684) 
  
District casualties while 
age 11-14 
  
0.0221 0.0015 
  
  
(0.0457) (0.0334) 
  
District casualties until 
survey 
    
0.0776* 0.0006 
    
(0.0433) (0.0364) 
Constant 0.3271*** 0.6703*** 0.3271*** 0.6711*** 0.0070 0.0277** 
 
(0.0260) (0.0246) (0.0261) (0.0248) (0.0175) (0.0132) 
Panel Variable District District District District District District 
Region x Year of Birth 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Age at Interview 
dummies 
No No No No Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Region x 
Age dummies 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3823 3055 3823 3055 9595 9267 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 69
a 
69
a
 
R-Squared 0.1106 0.0368 0.1105 0.0367 0.2028 0.2975 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. Columns (1) to (4): Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 5-9 
(treatment group) or 16-19 years old (control group) at the start of conflict in 1996. Columns (5) and (6): Sample only 
includes individuals surveyed in Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006, aged 10 to 18 at the time of the survey. 
a
 DHS data 
collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001, and so a number of districts were not covered, namely Dolpa, 
Jajarkot, Rolpa and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed either, but these districts 
did not experience any casualty during the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Impact of Alternative Conflict Variables on Primary Schooling Attainment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
School 
Destructions 
Female 
School 
Destructions 
Male 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Female 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Male 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Male –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 2 
Maoist Control 
Male –  
Definition 2 
Explained Variable Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x total 
district casualties 
0.0539* 0.0301 0.0638** 0.0231 
  
  
(0.0302) (0.0291) (0.0275) (0.0259) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
schools destroyed 2002-
2006 
0.4176 -1.7848 
    
  
(3.1298) (2.3395) 
    
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x total 
Maoist Abductions 
  
-0.0022*** 0.0002 
  
  
  
(0.0005) (0.0010) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 1) 
    
0.0916 0.2009***   
    
(0.0590) (0.0529)   
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 2) 
      
0.1456*** 0.0923* 
      
(0.0457) (0.0506) 
Constant 0.3271*** 0.6697*** 0.3261*** 0.6701*** 0.3255*** 0.6648*** 0.3240*** 0.6681*** 
 
(0.0260) (0.0245) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0264) (0.0245) (0.0265) (0.0246) 
Panel Variable District District District District District District District District 
Region x Year of Birth 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3823 3055 3823 3055 3823 3055 3823 3055 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.1106 0.0370 0.1118 0.0368 0.1105 0.0415 0.1130 0.0382 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. School destructions and abductions by Maoists are expressed per 1000 inhabitants. Sample only includes 
individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 5-9 (treatment group) or 16-19 years old (control group) at the start of conflict in 1996. Definition of district controlled by 
Maoist based either on matches between People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or based on government classification (Definition 2). Standard errors 
clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Impact of Conflict Intensity on Schooling Enrollment and Attainment, 5-14 year-olds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Years of 
Education 
Female 5-14 
Years of 
Education Male 
5-14 
Enrollment 
Female 5-14 
Enrollment Male 
5-14 
Explained Variable 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Enrolled Enrolled 
Specification Eq. (3) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) 
District casualties until start of 
survey 
0.2422** 0.1149 -0.0252 0.0221 
(0.1044) (0.1156) (0.0446) (0.0321) 
=1 if Rural -0.3992*** -0.1979*** -0.0585** -0.0292*** 
 
(0.0848) (0.0622) (0.0228) (0.0109) 
=1 if Head has primary education 0.3975*** 0.2654*** 0.2119*** 0.1407*** 
 
(0.0436) (0.0373) (0.0163) (0.0137) 
=1 if Head has secondary 
education 
1.2511*** 0.9885*** 0.2630*** 0.1745*** 
(0.0631) (0.0540) (0.0200) (0.0167) 
=1 if Head has higher education 1.5440*** 1.1224*** 0.3333*** 0.1747*** 
 
(0.1276) (0.1304) (0.0233) (0.0346) 
Constant 0.1064 -0.0388 0.3697*** 0.4528*** 
 
(0.0983) (0.0696) (0.0292) (0.0251) 
Panel variable District District District District 
Age at Interview dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Region x Age 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11798 12117 11798 12117 
No. of Clusters 69
a
 69
a
 69
a
 69
a
 
R-Squared 0.5158 0.6101 0.1597 0.1381 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006 and aged 5-14 at the time of 
the survey. 
a
 DHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001, and so a number of districts were not 
covered, namely Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed 
either, but these districts did not experience any casualty during the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district 
level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Impact of Conflict Intensity on Schooling Enrollment and Attainment, 15-18 year-olds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Years of 
Education 
Female 15-18 
Years of 
Education Male 
15-18 
Enrollment 
Female 15-18 
Enrollment Male 
15-18 
Explained Variable 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Enrolled Enrolled 
Specification Eq. (3) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) 
District casualties until start of 
survey 
0.5322* -0.0977 -0.0024 0.0062 
(0.2988) (0.2818) (0.0475) (0.0411) 
=1 if Rural -1.1541*** -1.0202*** -0.1109*** -0.0547** 
 
(0.2132) (0.1895) (0.0273) (0.0229) 
=1 if Head has primary education 0.7790*** 0.0797 0.0940*** -0.0054 
 
(0.1433) (0.1512) (0.0183) (0.0229) 
=1 if Head has secondary 
education 
2.9949*** 2.1377*** 0.3160*** 0.2208*** 
(0.1830) (0.1437) (0.0264) (0.0240) 
=1 if Head has higher education 4.1748*** 3.2704*** 0.4228*** 0.3586*** 
 
(0.2728) (0.2726) (0.0331) (0.0442) 
Constant 3.9172*** 5.4001*** 0.5180*** 0.7323*** 
 
(0.2240) (0.1952) (0.0312) (0.0274) 
Panel variable District District District District 
Age at Interview dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Region x Age 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3912 3420 3912 3420 
No. of Clusters 69
a
 69
a
 69
a
 69
a
 
R-Squared 0.2339 0.2100 0.1685 0.1450 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006 and aged 15-18 at the time of 
the survey.
a
 DHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001, and so a number of districts were not 
covered, namely Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed 
either, but these districts did not experience any casualty during the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district 
level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 8: Impact of Conflict during School Age on Female Early Marriage – DHS. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explained Variable Married by 15 
Married by 15 - 
here since 1996 
Married by 15 
Married by 15 - 
here since 1996 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
=1 if 6-9 in 1996 x district 
casualties 
0.0351 0.0853** 0.0255 0.0726* 
 
(0.0234) (0.0400) (0.0216) (0.0394) 
=1 if 6-9 in 1996 x Maoist 
abductions   
0.0026*** 0.0037*** 
   
(0.0004) (0.0011) 
Constant 0.2634*** 0.3504*** 0.2649*** 0.3478*** 
 
(0.0250) (0.0383) (0.0244) (0.0371) 
Panel variable District District District District 
Region x Year of Birth FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3217 1769 3217 1769 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0549 0.3084 0.0574 0.3115 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. Sample includes only individuals aged 6-9 (treatment group) or 16-19 (control group) years old at the start 
of conflict in 1996. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Impact of Conflict during Marriageable Age on Female Marital Status – DHS and NLSS. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Explained Variable Married by 21 
Married by 21 - 
here since 1996 
Married by 18  Married by 21 
Married by 21 - 
here since 1996 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
Dataset DHS 2006 NLSS 2003 DHS 2006 
=1 if 13-17 in 1996 x 
district casualties 
-0.0334 -0.0274 
 
-0.0339 -0.0229 
(0.0274) (0.0263) 
 
(0.0278) (0.0266) 
=1 if 13-17 in 1996 x 
district casualties up to 
NLSS 
  
0.0442 
  
  
(0.0423) 
  
=1 if 13-17 in 1996 x 
Maoist abductions 
   
0.0001 -0.0009 
   
(0.0008) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.8914*** 0.9086*** 0.6750*** 0.8914*** 0.9084*** 
 
(0.0174) (0.0154) (0.0326) (0.0175) (0.0152) 
Panel variable District District District District District 
Region x Year of Birth 
FE  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3178 1535 1519 3178 1535 
No. of Clusters 75 75 72 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0149 0.1760 0.0457 0.0149 0.1764 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. The sample only includes women aged 13-17 (treatment group) or 23-27 (control group) years old at the 
start of conflict in 1996 and surveyed in the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/04 (Column 3) or Demographic and 
Health Survey 2006 (all other columns). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1. Test for Pre-Conflict Differences in Primary Completion Trends 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Female Male 
Explained Variable Primary Primary 
Specification Eq. (4) Eq. (4) 
=1 if 23 in 1996 0.0165 -0.0029 
 
(0.0324) (0.0532) 
=1 if 22 in 1996 0.0261 -0.0321 
 
(0.0428) (0.0563) 
=1 if 21 in 1996 0.0704* 0.0148 
 
(0.0354) (0.0505) 
=1 if 20 in 1996 0.0011 -0.0631 
 
(0.0487) (0.0993) 
=1 if 19 in 1996 0.1464*** 0.0535 
 
(0.0457) (0.0616) 
=1 if 18 in 1996 0.1358*** 0.0674 
 
(0.0439) (0.0612) 
=1 if 17 in 1996 0.1582*** 0.0563 
 
(0.0485) (0.0578) 
=1 if 16 in 1996 0.1867*** 0.0791 
 
(0.0499) (0.0504) 
=1 if 15 in 1996 0.2495*** 0.1059* 
 
(0.0411) (0.0533) 
=1 if 19 in 1996 x district casualties (a) 0.0434 0.1002 
 
(0.0362) (0.0873) 
=1 if 18 in 1996 x district casualties (b) -0.0476** -0.0126 
 
(0.0222) (0.0348) 
=1 if 17 in 1996 x district casualties (c) 0.0052 -0.0463 
 
(0.0265) (0.0399) 
=1 if 16 in 1996 x district casualties (d) -0.0116 -0.0200 
 
(0.0351) (0.0375) 
=1 if 15 in 1996 x district casualties (e) -0.0041 0.0091 
 
(0.0288) (0.0436) 
Constant 0.2104*** 0.6183*** 
 
(0.0289) (0.0414) 
Panel variable District District 
Observations 3270 2306 
No. of Clusters 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0361 0.0091 
F-test Pre-Conflict Trend Difference (H0:{a=0 and b=0 
and c=0 and d=0 and e=0}) 
0.1420 0.3052 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties are expressed per 1000 
inhabitants. The sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 15-24 years old at the 
start of conflict in 1996. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
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Table A-2. Test for Pre-Conflict Differences in Primary Completion Trends - Alternative Conflict Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Explained Variable Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary 
Specification Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) 
=1 if 19 in 1996 x school destructions (a) 1.2658 -1.2937 
      
 
(4.2285) (5.7252) 
      
=1 if 18 in 1996 x school destructions (b) 1.5435 2.1234 
      
 
(4.2616) (2.4084) 
      
=1 if 17 in 1996 x school destructions (c) 2.7223 -1.2746 
      
 
(3.1558) (4.3314) 
      
=1 if 16 in 1996 x school destructions (d) 4.4805 -4.8978 
      
 
(3.6050) (3.8689) 
      
=1 if 15 in 1996 x school destructions (e) 0.3751 -2.3753 
      
 
(2.9461) (4.3606) 
      
=1 if 19 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (a) 
  
0.0030** 0.0005 
    
   
(0.0014) (0.0009) 
    
=1 if 18 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (b) 
  
0.0021*** -0.0008 
    
  
  
(0.0007) (0.0049) 
    
=1 if 17 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (c) 
  
-0.0001 0.0004 
    
   
(0.0005) (0.0022) 
    
=1 if 16 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (d) 
  
0.0019 -0.0029*** 
    
   
(0.0013) (0.0007) 
    
=1 if 15 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (e) 
  
0.0014*** -0.0002 
    
   
(0.0005) (0.0022) 
    
=1 if 19 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.1) (a) 
    
-0.0309 -0.1599 
  
     
(0.0757) (0.1067) 
  
=1 if 18 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.1) (b) 
    
-0.0325 -0.0744 
  
     
(0.0692) (0.1030) 
  
=1 if 17 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.1) (c) 
    
-0.0659 -0.2236** 
  
     
(0.0514) (0.0933) 
  
Continued on next page 
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Table A-2 Continued. Test for Pre-Conflict Differences in Primary Completion Trends - Alternative Conflict Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Explained Variable primary primary primary primary primary primary primary primary 
=1 if 16 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.1) (d) 
    
0.0330 0.1064 
  
     
(0.0598) (0.0910) 
  
=1 if 15 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.1) (e) 
    
-0.0691 -0.2670** 
  
     
(0.0505) (0.1066) 
  
=1 if 19 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.2) (a) 
      
0.0199 0.0491 
       
(0.0635) (0.0881) 
=1 if 18 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.2) (b) 
      
0.0300 -0.0539 
       
(0.0564) (0.0833) 
=1 if 17 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.2) (c) 
      
0.0472 -0.0316 
       
(0.0518) (0.0805) 
=1 if 16 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.2) (d) 
      
-0.0312 0.0723 
       
(0.0439) (0.0600) 
=1 if 15 in 1996 x Controlled by Maoists (Def.2) (e) 
      
0.0103 -0.0768 
       
(0.0529) (0.0861) 
Constant 0.2117*** 0.6188*** 0.2118*** 0.6183*** 0.2110*** 0.6192*** 0.2112*** 0.6181*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0415) (0.0289) (0.0414) (0.0287) (0.0410) (0.0290) (0.0413) 
Panel variable District District District District District District District District 
Year of Birth FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3270 2306 3270 2306 3270 2306 3270 2306 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0353 0.0081 0.0360 0.0085 0.0354 0.0134 0.0352 0.0090 
F-test Pre-Conflict Trend Difference (H0:{a=0 and 
b=0 and c=0 and d=0 and e=0}) 
0.8068 0.5602 0.0038 0.0000 0.6097 0.0065 0.8820 0.6194 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. School destructions and abductions by Maoists are expressed per 1000 inhabitants. The sample only includes 
individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 15 to 24 years old at the start of conflict in 1996. Definition of district controlled by Maoist based either on matches between 
People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or based on government classification (Definition 2). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in 
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table A-3. Test for Pre-Conflict Differences in Marriage Trends – DHS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explained Variable Married by 15 Married by 15 Married by 21 Married by 21 
Specification Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) 
=1 if 19 in 1996 x district casualties (a) -0.0532** 
   
 
(0.0257) 
   
=1 if 18 in 1996 x district casualties (b) -0.0413 
   
 
(0.0288) 
   
=1 if 17 in 1996 x district casualties (c) -0.0335 
   
 
(0.0264) 
   
=1 if 16 in 1996 x district casualties (d) -0.0178 
   
 
(0.0263) 
   
=1 if 15 in 1996 x district casualties (e) 0.0086 
   
 
(0.0266) 
   
=1 if 19 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (a) 
 
-0.0018 
  
 
 
(0.0013) 
  
=1 if 18 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (b) 
 
-0.0012 
  
 
 
(0.0011) 
  
=1 if 17 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (c) 
 
-0.0005 
  
 
 
(0.0007) 
  
=1 if 16 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (d) 
 
-0.0004 
  
 
 
(0.0010) 
  
=1 if 15 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (e) 
 
0.0005 
  
 
 
(0.0009) 
  
=1 if 26 in 1996 x district casualties (a) 
  
0.0140 
 
 
  
(0.0203) 
 
=1 if 25 in 1996 x district casualties (b) 
  
0.0406* 
 
 
  
(0.0208) 
 
=1 if 24 in 1996 x district casualties (c) 
  
0.0109 
 
 
  
(0.0248) 
 
=1 if 23 in 1996 x district casualties (d) 
  
-0.0001 
 
 
  
(0.0142) 
 
=1 if 22 in 1996 x district casualties (e) 
  
0.0327** 
 
 
  
(0.0147) 
 
=1 if 26 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (a) 
   
0.0033*** 
 
   
(0.0010) 
=1 if 25 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (b) 
   
0.0024*** 
 
   
(0.0008) 
=1 if 24 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (c) 
   
-0.0009 
 
   
(0.0020) 
=1 if 23 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (d) 
   
-0.0031*** 
 
   
(0.0010) 
=1 if 22 in 1996 x Maoist abductions (e) 
   
0.0014* 
 
   
(0.0008) 
Constant 0.3345*** 0.3349*** 0.8888*** 0.8908*** 
 
(0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0187) (0.0173) 
Continued on next page 
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Table A-3. Continued Test for Pre-Conflict Differences in Marriage Trends – DHS 
Panel Variable District District District District 
Year of Birth FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3091 3091 2473 2473 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0053 0.0045 0.0024 0.0099 
F-test Pre-Conflict Trend Difference 
(H0:{a=0 and b=0 and c=0 and d=0 and 
e=0}) 
0.1533 0.6893 0.1861 0.0000 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator. District casualties and abductions are 
expressed per 1000 inhabitants. Columns (1) and (2): The sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal 
DHS 2006 and aged 15 to 24 years old at the start of conflict in 1996. Columns (3) and (4): The sample only includes 
individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 22 to 30 years old at the start of conflict in 1996. Standard 
errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
